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Abstract
Conventional wisdom on the East Asian legal culture is that East Asia, including Korea, has been
non-litigious, generally avoiding legal proceedings. It is often argued that the traditional legal culture
of Korea was averse to trials, rendering customs and propriety (ye �) more significant than laws (pŏp
法), mediation (chochŏng 調停) and compromise (t’ahyŏp 妥協). Recently, a contrary view is put
forward forcefully, not in the least buttressed by the fact that the rate of legal proceedings is, in
actuality, higher in Korea than that in most other countries. 
According to the findings from the field of history, the Chosŏn dynasty was actually congested with
legal proceedings to the point of the district magistrates (heretofore suryŏng 守令) not being able to
accomplish much else. This paper delves into this question by conducting an empirical analysis of a
lawsuit filed in 1816 by a family in Kurye, a district in the Chŏlla province (全羅道). This study shows
that the nineteenth-century Chosŏn society went through a general transformation. At this juncture in
time, an individual was becoming more of an independent person rather than the merely passive
subject of the monarch at the mercy of the government officials that one had been up to this point in
time. The nineteenth-century individual no longer resembled the mid-Chosŏn one who spent their life
furthering the cause of Neo-Confucian ideology, the individual in the nineteenth century had become
one who actively pursued their rights, capable of maneuvering through the legal channels in the pursuit
of their self-interest.
I.  Introduction
Recently, East Asia, including Korea, has been understood to have been
ensconced in a culture that generally avoided legal proceedings. A few examples
of scholars who have argued this perspective are Takeyoshi Kawashima of Japan
and Pyungchoon Hahm of Korea. In particular, Hahm’s argument can be
summarized as follows. In examining the modern Korean legal system, while the
structure itself was modeled after the German system as modified by Japan, the
legal culture can be said still to be mired in a traditional, premodern state.
Furthermore, the traditional legal culture of Korea was alegalistic [sic], rendering
customs and propriety (ye �) more significant than laws (pŏp 法), mediation
(chochŏng 調停) and compromise (t’ahyŏp 妥協) preferred over trials, leading to
a general avoidance of litigation. Consequently, the concept of justice has always
been strictly aimed at achieving substantive resolutions (silchil chihyangchŏk 實
質 指向的) as well as being irrational (pihamnichŏk 非合理的) in essence. As
such, there can be no lesson learnt from the abovementioned legal culture for
fostering a modern constitutional state.1) As of late, much scholarship in
opposition to the above viewpoint has been emerging, not in the least buttressed
by the fact that legal proceedings are not few in number in contemporary Korea;
the rate of legal proceedings is, in actuality, higher in Korea than that in most
other countries.2)
In the field of jurisprudence, however, there has been a relative lack of historical
study of the subject at hand, instead focusing on the contemporary legal proceedings.
According to the findings from the field of history, the Chosŏn dynasty was actually
congested with legal proceedings to the point of the district magistrates (heretofore
1) Yang Kŏn, “Han’guk esŏŭi ‘pŏp kwa sahoe’ yŏn’gu (Investigation of Law and Society in Korea)” in Pŏp
kwa Sahoe 1 [Law and Society 1] (Ch’angjak kwa Pip’yŏngsa, 1989); “Hanguk kwa Ilpon kanŭi Pigyo pŏpmunhwa
non ŭ l wihan sŏsŏl (An Introduction to the Comparative Studies on Jurisprudence in Korea and Japan)” in
Chŏsŭtisŭ [Justice] 34-1 (Han’guk pŏphag’wŏn, 2001. 2).  
2) Such discussions and arguments usually involved the idea of the appropriate number of those in the legal
profession.  Han Sanghoe, Pyŏnhosa wa chŏkchŏngsu [Lawyers and an Apropos Number of Them] and Cho Uhyŏn,
“Pŏpchoin chŏchŏngsu e taehan sogo (A Look at What the Appropriate Number of Lawyers Is)” in Pŏp kwa Sahoe
11 [Law and Society 11] (Ch’angjak kwa Pip’yŭngsa, 1995); Yang Kŏn, “Hanguk esŏŭi ‘pŏp kwa sahoe’ yŏngu
(Investigation of ‘Law and Society’ in Korea)” in Pŏp kwa Sahoe 1 [Law and Society 1] (Ch’angjak kwa
Pip’yŏngsa, 1989).
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suryŏng 守令) not being able to accomplish much else.3) However, there has been
little effort to study in conjunction the historical facts and the contemporary
explosion of legal proceedings.4)
This paper seeks to examine the process of solving legal disputes in the local
societies (hyangch’onsahoe 鄕村社會) of the late Chosŏn period by analyzing a
lawsuit filed in 1816 by a family in Kurye, a district in the Chŏlla province (全羅道).
The specific case dealt with in this paper arose in the tenth month of the year 1816
and continued until the second month of the following year, involving an inheritance
dispute amongst Yu Chinŏk (柳鎭億), his paternal aunt of secondary birth status
(sŏgomo 庶姑母) Widow Yu (Yu Kwanyŏ柳寡女), and her son Hong Hŭigap (洪喜
甲), yielding about ten petitions (heretofore soji 所志).5) In general, soji tend to be
rather piecemeal, their contents quite fragmentary, but the soji of the Yu dispute are
unusual in the following ways: first, there are ten soji for the same case, providing an
outline of the proceedings of the lawsuit, including the trial itself; second, of the ten
soji, six were those submitted to the government (kwanbu 官府) and subsequently
received decisions (chesa題辭), four were written based on the decisions (chesa) of
the soji no longer extant and include memoranda (sugi ‚手記) relevant to the other
soji. There still exists, furthermore, the original inheritance document (punjaegi分財
記) that precipitated the legal dispute.6)
In this paper, first, a brief summary of the process of trials during the Chosŏn
3) Chŏn Kyŏngmok, Chosŏn hugi Sansong Yŏn’gu [Studies on the Late Chosŏn Litigations Involving Burial
Ground Matters] (Ph.D. Diss., Chŭnbuk National University, 1996); Pak Myŏnggyu, “19 segi huban hyangch’on
sahoe ŭi kaltŭng kujo (The Details of Conflicts in the Countryside Village Societies in the Latter Part of the
Nineteenth Century)” in Han’guk munhwa [Korean Culture] 14 (Seoul National University Han’guk munhwa
yŏn’guso, 1994).
4) Im Sanghyŏk, “Chosŏn chŏgi minsa sosong kwa sosong iron ŭi chŏn’gae (The Development of the Civil
Suits and Theory on Litigation in the Early Chosŏn)” Ph.D. diss., Seoul National University, 1994.
5) Soji are documents composed by the non-official sector of society and turned into the government when in
need of resolution for legal disputes, and as they were compiled due to a real necessity, their contents reflect clearly
certain aspects of a society in a given time period.  Furthermore, a great number of them are extant due to the
involved parties having preserved them as these documents contained matters of gains and losses. Ch’oe Sŭnghŭi,
han’guk komunsŏ yŏn’gu [Investigation of Documents Originating from Premodern Korea] (Kaejŏng chŭngpop’an;
Chisik sanŏpsa, 1989), pp.306-307. 
6) Han’guk chŏngsin munhwa yŏn’guwŏn, Komunsŏ chipsŏng vol. 37, 38 Kurye Munhwa Yussika
[Compilation of Premodern Documents, vol. 37, 38; Munhwa Yu Descent Group of Kurye] (Han’guk chŏngsin
munhwa yŏn’guwŏn, 1998), heretofore referenced as Chipsŏng. 
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dynasty will be presented for the benefit of the readers, subsequently leading to an
analysis of the dispute at hand. This will be followed by a close examination of the
actual conditions of legal proceedings, as well as an exploration, amongst others, of
the application of laws and the concept of rights in the said time period.7) While this
paper is limited in scope by its focus on the Kurye region in the Chŏlla province, it
can provide a general depiction of the realities of the early-nineteenth-century trials
and the application of laws, thereby enabling us to reconstruct a part of life in the
Chosŏn local societies.
II.  Trials in the Chosŏn Dynasty
In the Chosŏn dynasty, trials were referred to as songsa(訟事). The terminologies
for the trials, conceptually divided, were as follows: sasong(詞訟) for civil suits and
oksong (獄訟) for criminal cases, both under the umbrella of the term ch’ŏngsong(聽
訟). In reality, however, the two types of lawsuits were not strictly separated and
compartmentalized, and, as such, led to the frequent discontinuation of the civil trial
when criminal elements were found within the case, ensuing in the opening of the
criminal trial. Only when the criminal suit closed did the civil trial resume.
Following the established local administration system, a coordination of
investigation by different legal institutions (simkŭp chedo 審級制度) became more
refined, yielding a tripartite structure, beginning at the level of suryŏng to the
provincial governor (kwanch’alsa 觀察使: kamsa 監司, sunsang 巡相), ultimately
ending at the Ministry of Punishments (hyŏngjo 刑曹). In other words, the officials
at the suryŏng level-namely moksa 牧使, pusa 府使, kunsu 郡守, hyŏllyŏng 縣令,
hyŏnkam縣監, et cetera-dealt directly with all civil cases as well as those correlative
to a punishment level lesser than flogging (t’aehyŏng 笞刑). The plaintiffs who lost
their claim in trial at the first level (ilsim一審) had the recourse to submit their case
to the provincial governor's office, a process called ŭisong (義送). The provincial
governor did not personally try these appealed cases, but did engage in close
investigations of the facts of the case as well as the reasons behind the court's
decision at the first level, subsequently proffering the conclusions on the said
7) Original texts will be cited using the number of the soji and the lines to which I am referring.  
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investigation including recommendations, a document called either kamgyŏl (甘結)
or kwanmun (關文). These documents were sent back to the suryŏng who usually
followed the recommendations offered and revised the former judgment. In addition,
the contents of the ŭisong could be sent up to the Ministry of Punishments, the only
organ simultaneously overseeing any legal proceedings and acting as the body
rendering final decisions for all lawsuits. As the source of all jurisdiction was the
monarch, in reality all of the ultimate decision-making power rested with the king.
A direct appeal to this ultimate authority was called sang’ŏn (上言) or kyŏkchaeng
(擊錚). The former was done on paper, the latter by striking a gong in front of the
monarch's procession (haengch’a 行車).  
Though the Chosŏn society was organized according to people’s stations based
on birth, actual limitations on the different classes were exercised only in the sphere
of public law, not in the execution of private statutes. As such, commoners as well as
slaves were eligible to file lawsuits on an individual basis. The only exception to this
practice was the treatment of married women who were constrained by the law
separating the inner and the outer realms (nae’oe’pŏp 內外法); no lawsuit could be
filed directly by women, and the claim was instead forwarded by a close family
member, a process called taesong (代訟). In addition, disputes arising amongst close
kin were discouraged from being filed as lawsuits, in some cases those who did take
action were punished for doing so. Amicable settlements were actively promoted,
inasmuch as they were within the range of possibility, thereby effecting a general
avoidance, to a certain extent, of decisions rendered by trials. The presentation of a
soji, which was called tanja (單子) for the yangban and palgwal (白活) for the
commoners, initiated legal proceedings. Certain prescribed formalities were required
in all cases. In the mid-nineteenth century, a volume called Yusŏp’ilji (儒胥必知)
containing guidelines for the different soji styles was issued by a private
publisher(sach’an私撰). According to the regulations stipulated, all civil suits had to
be filed within the five-year limit following the incidents which precipitated the
lawsuits. There was an exception to this rule wherein the five-year limit was voided
where the lawsuit itself took longer than five years or if the plaintiff's right to claim
suits was somehow violated. However, by the late Chosŏn the cases that could be
considered for the aforementioned exception rule became constrained by rigid
boundaries, and the time limit was shortened, both changes instituted in order to
discourage lawsuits from being filed. Should one file a suit past the statute of
limitation (chŏngsokihan 呈訴期限), the claimant was punished for “filing a suit
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based on unreasonableness” (piri hosong 非理好訟), and the suryŏng who received
the claim knowing that this set time limit had passed was penalized for the “crime of
knowing the falsehood” (chibi’o’gyŏl choe 知非誤決罪). Most of these rules,
however, were neither strictly followed nor enforced; the cases ineligible under the
strict regulations were usually accepted and settled regardless.  
After the plaintiff presented the soji, the defendant submitted a response
document, a process called “sisong tajim (始訟 音).” The defendant was not duty-
bound to appear in court; it was the plaintiff's responsibility to bring the defendant.
Legal proceedings began with the testimony of the plaintiff and continued with the
defense, the plaintiff then submitting direct evidence as well as presenting
eyewitnesses. And following the adage, “Trials shall be in accordance with
documents,” trials were in fact strictly based on written materials. A volume called
Ch’ŏngsongsik (聽訟式) was compiled, in effect, to record the details of conducting
trials such as the specific proceedings of the trials and the method of discerning the
authenticity of the submitted documents. According to regulations, decisions against
the plaintiffs were rendered without fail when, after the lawsuit had already begun,
the plaintiff did not appear in court thirty times out of the fifty hearings; this was due
to time constraints and concerns. Lawsuits concluded with the court's decisions,
contained in what is sometimes referred to as kyŏlsong ib'an(抉訟�案; heretofore
ib’an). This document consisted of daily records of all the processes of the trials and
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff and the defendant, as well as the eyewitness
accounts noted on paper, enclosing in the final pages the decision proffered by the
judge. Due to the extravagant cost and the hassle of composing the ib’an, ipchi (�
旨) -simple certificate- was instead put together in simple cases such as small claims.
In most situations, however, the recipient of favorable decision not only requested
the more complicated ib’an, but also the destruction of documents submitted by the
opposing party in order to prevent being involved in the headache of the appeals
process.  
The losing party could always appeal, of course, in addition to re-submitting the
complaint to a newly appointed suryŏng or to another in the surrounding districts.
This led to the possibility of the perpetuation of lawsuits and disputes, as well as to
the difficulties in confirming a decision already rendered. Consequently, rules such
as “3-trials-2-wins” or “5-trials-3-wins” were implemented, but to no real avail. The
claimant, in reality, could continue to file suits until realistically or psychologically
satisfied with the rendered decision. In other words, there was, within the legal
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system, no real power in the finality of decisions or a foolproof method to prevent
the court's decision from being overturned by another. This non-existence of
absolute power in the hands of the courts displays a cultural belief in the superiority
of the substantive justice over procedural justice.  
The soji was not easy for the commoners to compose due to the prescribed
formal requirements. Therefore, there were those who, as their profession, put
together the documents on behalf of others, an occupation that can be found even in
the beginning of the Chosŏn dynasty. These professionals instructed people on the
methods of filing suits in addition to compiling the soji, at times sharing the profits
by handling the filings themselves. Usually these proxy handlers were active around
the Changnyewŏn (掌�院) in the early Chosŏn period, an organ that dealt with suits
filed regarding slave ownership. So they were called Oejibu (外支部). In order to
control the explosion in the number of lawsuits, the central government, which had
concluded that such increase in suits was largely due to the proxy handlers, punished
these people by sending the whole household to border regions (chŏnga sabyŏn全家
徙邊) depending on the severity of their crimes and rewarded those who informed
the government of their dealings. Despite these preventive measures, the
government did not succeed in uprooting the business of proxy handlers, as, while to
the government they were the cause of increasing legal disputes, for the commoners
they served as conduits to the resolution of distress and restoration of rights.8)
III.  Development of the Dispute in Kurye
In general, it is difficult to ascertain precisely the development of a given dispute
due to the fact that all the pertinent soji record the years and months, but not the
specific dates. Through the contents of these soji and the chesa, however, an
approximation of the development can be reached. The following table illustrates the
temporal progress of the dispute extrapolated from the contents of the soji used in
this paper. 
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8) Pak Pyŏngho, Han’guk pŏpchesa [History of the Korean Legislative System] (Han’guk T’ongsin taehak
Ch’ulp’anbu, 1986).
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# Date Soji Claimants, Residence Addressed Chesa SourcePage # Notes
18 1816. 9
Petition (wŏnjŏng) by Madame
Cho, grandaughter-in-law of




X 103 Draft of the vernacularsoji (#20)
20 1816.10
Petition (wŏnjŏng) by Madame
Cho, grandaughter-in-law of





Contains a record of the
chesa by the provincial
governor re: the petition
by the paternal uncle
21 1816. 10
Petition (wŏnjŏng) by Madame














11. 1 105 Yu released uponpayment of 480 yang
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Sugi by Hong Sŏkyŏng



















Chesa on soji 19, 17;
chesa by the Provincial
Governor re: appeals
(*3)



















by Hong Sŏkyŏng and
his son
Outline of Soji Examined
It is impossible to extract a whole picture of the development of this case because
only the soji by Yu Chinŏk and his wife are extant today; the soji filed by Hong
Hŭigap, the opposing party, has not been found.9) In examining the extant soji,
however, the development of the lawsuit can be divided into two stages as follows:  the
first stage is the process of the trying to garner an acquittal for Yu Chinŏk who was
imprisoned due to Widow Yu’s false accusations; the second involves the course of
reimbursing the bail money of 480 yang paid upon Yu’s imprisonment, in addition to
repossessing the counterfeit documents and Yu Chinŏk’s subsequent efforts to receive
an ib’an to prevent any future problems that may be caused by the false allegations.
A. Yu Chinŏk’s Imprisonment and Acquittal
In the fall of 1816, Yu Chinŏk’s paternal aunt of secondary birth Widow Yu and
her son Hong Hŭ igap filed a motion, based on the will of Hong’s maternal
grandfather Yu Iju written in the vernacular (ŏnmunsuchŏk 諺文手跡), demanding a
part of the Yu family inheritance. Hong, et al., first filed with the Magistrate of
Kurye (hyŏkam) but appeared to have lost, thereafter appealing to the Provincial
Governor of Chŏlla (kamsa). The provincial governor, however, dismissed as being
trivial the matter of Hong’s request for his portion of the inheritance and refused to
render a verdict. On the other hand, the provincial governor considered the case a
flagrant violation of moral principles (kangsang 綱常) by Yu Chinŏk, who was
accused of abusing his aunt, thus categorizing it as a criminal case, and subsequently
ordered the magistrate of Kurye to investigate the case thoroughly as one of a
yangban man “abusing and ousting his paternal aunt.”10) The magistrate of Kurye
imprisoned Yu Chinŏk and urged him to pay Hong 4,700 yang, which was
equivalent to the price of land allegedly bequeathed to Hong. Then Yu Chinŏk’s
paternal uncle et al. submitted a petition (wŏnchŏng 原情) on Yu’s behalf to the
provincial governor’s office, but that office imprisoned these people. Ultimately, Yu
9) Yu Chinŏk, et al., most likely ended up receiving all the documents, more specifically the forged documents
handed in by Hong Hŭigap, that they requested from the district office; the reason the returned documents do not
exist today is most likely that the Yu family destroyed them to prevent future problems.  
10) Soktaejŏn, Hyŏngjŏn, “Ch’ŏngni:” “In cases of kin filing suits against one another wherein allegations of
abuse of an elder or someone of lower status and/or younder age are forwarded, these allegations of abuse must be
dealt as criminal matter before proceeding to the actual suit.”
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Chinŏk’s wife of the surname Cho (Cho’ssi; heretofore Madame Cho) presented a
soji (tenth month; soji 20) to the Provincial Governor of Chŏlla (kamsa).  
In the soji, Madame Cho protested that the provincial circuit headquarters
(sunyŏng) had reached a verdict only by considering the forged will submitted by
Widow Yu, and that authentic will (tomungi 都文記) left by Madame Cho’s
grandfather-in-law Yu Iju was ignored. She also refuted Hong Hŭigap’s contention
based on the following reasons: first, division of inheritance must follow strictly the
will of the head of the estate (chaeju 財主) in question to prevent future disputes;11)
second, even an inheritor of low birth is recorded in the will if designated as a
recipient of a part of the estate, and yet Madame Cho’s aunt-in-law, Widow Yu, was
not noted as such in the original will. If, Madame Cho continued, there ever had
been a part of the assets set aside as the aunt-in-law’s inheritance, the aunt-in-law
should have claimed it at the time of the proprietor’s death. That the aunt-in-law
was, however, requesting her share only twenty years after the death of the head of
the estate, showed that the head of the estate, Madame Cho’s grandfather-in-law, had
not in fact intended to leave any inheritance for Widow Yu, which proved
indubitably that the document forwarded by Widow Yu et al. had been forged.
Madame Cho further asserted that the share claimed by Widow Yu had originally
been intended for K’waesul(快述), the secondary son of Madame Cho’s grandfather-
in-law, who expressed as his dying wish that, should K’waesul meet an early death,
the sum left for him should then be set aside to defray the cost of proper ancestral
rites (chewijo 祭位條). As such, the sum left for the secondary son could not be re-
apportioned to the aunt-in-law. Finally, Madame Cho appealed that the aunt-in-law
had never been mistreated, and requested that her husband be acquitted of the
charges of abusing and ousting his paternal aunt (tenth month; soji 20). Madame
Cho further asserted the following in a soji written in literary Chinese, which was
ultimately not submitted (soji 18): first, the handwriting-signature (sugyŏl 手決),
supposedly of her grandfather-in-law, presented by the plaintiff could be shown
undoubtedly to be a forgery when compared to the signatures contained in the
original will; second, the Magistrate of Kurye took into consideration only Widow
Yu’s forged document and disregarded the original will when imprisoning Yu
Chinŏk, now the head of the family, and urged him to impart the assets by blatantly
11) “In general, the division of inheritance follows the document composed by the head of the estate (chaeju財
主); this is in order to prevent future disputes (soji 18: lines 4-5).”
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ignoring the principles of legal proceedings.12)
In summary, Madame Cho asserted the following: first, the document presented
by Widow Yu was forged; second, her grandfather-in-law, Yu Iju, never intended to
impart any of his assets to Widow Yu; third, the magistrate of Kurye, by ignoring the
original will of the deceased, reached a verdict in favor of Hong Hŭigap, et al., and
their forged document, and; finally, there was never any abuse of Widow Yu, the
paternal aunt of Yu Chinŏk and aunt-in-law to Madame Cho.  
The provincial governor dealt with Madame Cho’s aforementioned petition as
follows. Paternal aunts of secondary birth are the same in kin relations as paternal
uncles (samch’on三寸), and therefore abusing and ousting a relative, albeit of
secondary birth, is never in line with the proper conduct of any yangban. In addition,
though Widow Yu filed a claim based on false accusations, if in the past treated well,
she would not have felt the need to forward such a claim. The fault, therefore, lay
with Yu Chinŏk and his wife, and, furthermore, the provincial governor’s office had
no reason to be involved in the division of inheritance (tenth month, fifth day; soji 20
chesa). The governor’s office, in other words, reinforced the decision rendered by
the magistrate of Kurye based on the charges of abuse against the aunt without
having reached any verdict regarding Madame Cho’s claim that Widow Yu, et al.,
had forwarded counterfeit documents. The only decision the Governor’s office
(sunyŏng) actually proffered was that it did not want to intervene in inheritance
matters because they were to remain a matter only for the family to decide, not those
in which the Governor’s office should be involved.  
Having lost in the appeal (nakkwa�科), Madame Cho again submitted a petition
to the Kurye district. The Madame claimed: 
My husband’s paternal-aunt, though of secondary birth, is a close relative
equivalent to paternal-uncle (samch’on). Being a yangban, how could [my
husband] not know proper ethics? Moreover, even after I came to my husband’s
house and took over the household affairs, my aunt-in-law has never demanded
any part of the family assets; therefore, what my husband and I have done cannot
be considered an act of abusing and ousting a relative (soji 21: lines 7-8).   
12) “You have imprisoned my husband having looked only into one page of a document forged by Widow Yu,
without making inquiries into the circumstances and details of the case...(soji 18: line 8)”.
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In response to Madame Cho’s claims, the magistrate’s verdict was as follows:
“The assets that justly need to be apportioned and allotted to Widow Yu, et al., must
without fail be given to the said plaintiffs before your husband’s disgraceful act can
be settled (tenth month, eighth day; soji 21 chesa).”  
Soon after the abovementioned decision was rendered, Madame Cho decided to
permit the allotment of part of the Yu family assets to the plaintiffs, upon committing
to the idea that her husband’s swift release from prison and the refutation of false
accusations was of utmost importance.13) Subsequently, Madame Cho, following the
order from the provincial government (yŏngŭp 營邑) to give Hong Hŭigap, et al.,
480 yang in compensation, imparted this amount to the Hong party and waited for
her husband’s release. Her husband, however, was kept in prison, and again Madame
Cho submitted a petition to the provincial government. 
In other words, Madame Cho had believed, as was stipulated in the decision rendered
for her first petition, that the matter of her husband’s crime (or lack thereof) would be
settled if she paid the said amount. In its stead, Yu Iju’s, brothers who had importuned for
her husband Yu Chinŏk’s release, were themselves placed in custody.  Madame Cho,
moreover, lamented the following facts: while her father-in-law was alive no kin close or
distant and no relatives living in the neighboring villages had ever come forward to claim
shares of the inheritance, but; now the Yu family was being sued when her father-in-law’s
death had not yet been more than twenty years in passing. Subsequently, she again
appealed for her husband to be freed of the false accusation of “abusing and ousting an
aunt (komo kuch’uk姑母驅逐).” The provincial governor responded:
The allotment of family assets is not a matter for the government officials to
decide. In addition, Widow Yu filed a lawsuit accusing Yu Chinŏk of
mistreating her, his aunt. Such a crime has always been dealt with severely as
the punishment can serve to rectify improper customs through edification and
correct governance.  Though we have tried to reclaim the compensation for
the paddy fields, there seems to be no practicable way. As Yu Chinŏk has
been imprisoned for a long time, we order his immediate release (eleventh
month, first day; soji 19 chesa).
Subsequently, Yu Chinŏk was released.
13) “I do not lament the imparting of our assets; only, I entreat you, please, spare my husband (soji 21:line 9)!”.   
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B. Rehabilitation of Yu Chinŏk’s Rights
Circumstances seem to have changed rather rapidly following Yu Chinŏk’s
release from prison. Upon his release, Yu promptly demanded the following to
prevent future troubles: the two documents presented by Hong Sŏkyŏng and his son,
Hong Hŭigap, which began the whole dispute; the allegedly forged will written in
the vernacular along with the official decision written on the back of the soji (ŏnjang
pae’gwan 諺�背關), and; finally, in the form of an ipchi, the explanation of the
grounds for the government (kwan) paying out 480 yang to Hong Hŭ igap, an
amount in toto that Madame Cho paid due to the dispute caused by Hong Hŭigap
and Yu Yŏngmuk. He was Yu Chinŏk’s brother derived from the same paternal
great-grandfather and anticipated being adopted instead of Yu Chinŏk’s and hoped to
succeed to Yu Family’s properties. (eleventh month; soji 14).  
Despite all of Yu Chinŏk’s efforts to prevent further problems, Hong Hŭigap
tried to stir up trouble once again; Yu Chinŏk’s biological paternal uncle (samch’on
三寸) in defense submitted another soji and received a verdict barring Hong from
filing yet another lawsuit, and otherwise struggled to convince Hong not to cause
additional strife.  Hong, however, asserted that a division of family assets was not a
matter in which the government (kwanchang) should be involved, and, as such, had
to be settled privately. Consequently, Hong showed up with a promissory note for
3,500 yang. Yu Chinŏk in defense composed a soji demanding the documents he had
requested in his previous soji mentioned above, in addition to the refund of the 480
yang paid out earlier (eleventh month; soji 15). For reasons unknown, Yu Chinŏk
did not actually submit this soji to the Kugye district government.  
Of the 480 yang Yu Chinŏk paid, 50 yang was paid out to Hong Hŭigap by the
district government, the rest held at the local bureau of punishments
(hyŏngbangch’ŏng刑房廳). When Yu requested the reimbursement of 430 yang, the
Magistrate (sŏngju) ordered him to wait for a verdict (eleventh month, eighth day;
soji 17 chesa), but the verdict was never actually issued. Subsequently, Yu Chinŏk
again filed a petition with the provincial government (sunyŏng). From the provincial
government (sunyŏng) came the decision: “The money collected by the district office
is not a matter for the provincial government (yŏngmun), therefore we remand the
matter to the district office (soji 16).” Subsequent to this order, Yu Chinŏk composed
yet another soji requesting a refund of the entire 480 yang since, Yu claimed, there
was no need to pay Hong Hŭigap any money (eleventh month; soji 16).  
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In addition to the refund, Yu Chinŏk requested any documents concerning the
dispute as well as an ipchi to be issued. The response by the bureau of punishments
(hyŏngbang) to Yu’s appeal was, however, postponed again and again without
proper grounds. Frustrated with the lack of action, Yu wanted to file another petition,
this time to the substitute district magistrate, but since the verdict from the provincial
government already ordered the pertinent district to deal with the matter on its level,
Yu’s petition to the substitute district magistrate would most likely have been turned
down.  In addition, the repeated appeals could potentially bring punishment to his
relatives again. There was also no guarantee that the former magistrate of Kurye
would again be appointed to this office; as such Yu kept his silence for the time
being.  In the mean time, the position of the magistrate of Kurye became vacant, and
in the second month of the following year, Yu submitted a petition to the substitute
district magistrate(kyŏmsŏngju兼城主).
The substitute replied with the following verdict:
The former official’s behaviour appears to be truly regretful. I came to know
that before I had finished reading even half the appeal.  I cannot understand
the reason behind the former official’s not giving to the petitioner the
documents submitted by Hong Hŭigap. However, a new official is soon to be
taking office, and the petitioner should then file a motion with him (year
1817, second month, twenty-fifth day; soji 22 chesa).
The substitute, in other words, agreed with Yu’s petition, yet he did not issue an
ib’an due to his lack of any real jurisdiction over the case.  
Soon afterward, the new official was appointed as the magistrate of Kurye and
Yu then filed his motion. The magistrate proffered the following verdict in the year
1817, twenty-seventh day of the second lunar month, confirming the finality of a
favorable decision for Yu (soji 38 chesa):
Hong Hŭ igap, not to mention the right and wrong of this case, is truly
difficult to edify. How can we ignore the depravity of Hong’s false
accusations against his maternal family (oega), claiming that the family had
mistreated the Hong and his direct kin, and say that Hong’s petition is in the
right? Even if the lost documents (sugi) were truly from Hong’s maternal
grandfather, Hong should still be unable to file a lawsuit seeking to correct the
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wrong, since in the meantime Hong has already received some property:
How, then, can he file a suit with forged documents? Considering this one act,
we can come to know everything else. .... As for the lost documents in the
midst of the legal proceedings, the misplacement happened while the former
official was still in office; therefore, I cannot myself find and return them.
Generally speaking, propriety and reason exist unto themselves, so what use
would the gain and loss of the documents have to do with them? Moving
forward, should there be more of the same evil practices, this certificate must
be used as evidence for defense against such wickedness.
The verdict came in favor of Yu Chinŏk as filing a claim against one’s maternal
family itself-as had been done by Hong Hŭigap-was found to be immoral, in addition
to the judgment that the will submitted by Hong, et al., could not be accepted.
The case at hand had begun as an inheritance battle between Yu Chinŏk and
Hong Hŭ igap, the son of Yu’s paternal-aunt of secondary birth. The civil suit
precipitated by the dispute was considered also to be a criminal one, leading to the
imprisonment of Yu Chinŏk; this stage of the case was concluded only after Hong
Hŭigap was given money in exchange for Yu’s release. Upon his release, Yu tried to
receive an ib’an to prevent future troubles, but when Hong, still dissatisfied with the
compensation received, again caused problems, Yu tried to reclaim the
compensation given to Hong. From this point on, the case was in actuality a
continuing conflict amongst Yu, the magistrates, and his administrative assistants
(isŏ �胥). Yu Chinŏk was able to recover his rights only after he had submitted
approximately ten soji, in addition to suffering the shame of his kinsmen being
confined due to having appealed on his behalf.   
IV.  Litigations and the Mobilization of the Law 
Through examining the case discussed above, we can grasp the realities of the
nineteenth-century Chosŏn legal procedures by closely exploring the process and
progress of the lawsuit at hand. Though Hong Hŭigap was trying to obtain a part of
the maternal family’s estate, he did not merely appeal to familial sentiments, but in
fact employed legal channels. Yu Chinŏk, in defense, also engaged in diverse legal
maneuverings and asserted his rights. In this we can see the capacity of the members
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of the general public to mobilize the law in their favour as well as a facet of their
concept of rights in the nineteenth century.
Hong Hŭigap and Yu Chinŏk never had any direct contact between themselves
regarding their dispute, and instead indirectly filed claims against each other through
the Kurye district and the provincial government. In order to win their claims, both
Hong and Yu employed diverse and creative legal measures. This section will
explore the formal aspects of litigation and the proceedings of lawsuits, as well as
the significance and modes of mobilizing legal measures. 
A. The Proceedings of Litigation
Yu Chinŏk was imprisoned due to the accusation that he had abused and ousted
his paternal aunt and ordered to pay 4,700 yang to the Kurye district. Afterward, the
provincial government and the Kurye district avoided rendering a decision regarding
the payment submitted. As mentioned previously, the civil case concerning an
inheritance dispute became a criminal one based on the accusation of Yu’s ousting an
aunt; this is a clear example of the characteristics of the litigation proceedings in the
Chosŏn dynasty, which treated ethics and social mores with much gravity.  According
to the Great Criminal Code of Ming Dynasty (Taemyŏngnyul 大明�), the crime of
abusing and ousting an aunt carried with it the punishment of eighty floggings and
two years of imprisonment.14) In Yu Chinŏk’s case, the detainment was for about two
months after having fallen prey to Hong Hŭigap’s plan to turn the suit in his favor by
filing a false accusation. In addition, all of Yu Chinŏk’s relatives including his
biological paternal uncle entreating on Yu’s behalf were also confined, Yu being
released only after he submitted the 480 yang to the local bureau of punishments.
The process of appeals in the Chosŏn began at the district level, then moved on
to the provincial governor’s office, and finally to the Ministry of Punishments, in
rare cases all the way to the monarch.15) At the first level, Yu Chinŏk et al. appealed
to the provincial government and the Kurye district, and the Kurye district, for its
part, released Yu following the order from the provincial government.  In the second
phase, Yu Chinŏk repeated his appeals to the Kurye magistrate and the provincial
14) Taemyŏngnyul, Hy’ongnyul T’ugu. 
15) O Kapkyun, Chosŏnsidae sapŏp chedo yŏn’gu [Studies on the Judicial System of the Chosŏn Dynasty]
(Samyŏngsa, 1995).  
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government, with the latter subsequently relegating the final decision to the former.
That Yu, et al., did not in fact file an appeal with the Ministry of Punishments might
have been due to the geographical distance, but it is more likely that this lack of
appeal to the highest level was caused by the development of the decisions being
rendered. In other words, as the organ that actually rendered verdicts was the district
magistrate provincial governor, from Yu Chinŏk’s perspective, the decision rendered
by the aforementioned organ rather than that proffered by the Ministry of
Punishments was much more effective.  
As such, Yu repeatedly filed appeals at the same level, and though the district
office punished Yu due to the numerous filings (soji 11: line 7), it nevertheless
avoided making any real decisions regarding restricting his appeals, ultimately
relegating the verdict to the Kurye district.16) This exemplifies well the function and
characteristics of the civil suits; the litigation proceedings did not conclude
depending on the process and progress of the lawsuit, and the claimant could
repeatedly file until satisfied either in reality or psychologically. In other words,
rather than formal justice carried out following a set procedure, the civil suits
depended on a type of real and substantive justice taking into utmost consideration
the claimant’s satisfaction.17)
Yu Chinŏk won his case having appealed only once to the newly appointed
Kurye district magistrate. Why, then, did the Chŏlla provincial governor’s office and
the Kurye district magistrate either avoid rendering a decision or repeatedly
postpone the litigation proceedings? The Chŏlla provincial governor’s office at this
time was Kim Kyokŭn (1816. 3-1817. 7),18) and the Kurye district magistrate was
first Hong Nag’u (appointed 1816. 3),19) then O Ch’ihun (1817. 2-1819).20) The
Chŏlla provincial governor’s office initially detained Yu Chinŏk on the charges of
16) Such practices have been discontinued in contemporary Korea.
17) In order to understand the function and characteristics of this type of litigation, Hong Hŭigap’s response to
entire process needs to be investigated thoroughly; unfortunately, his assertions and opinions on the matter cannot be
known.  
18) From a volume edited by Yi Tonghŭi called Chosŏn sidae Chŏlladoŭi Kamsa Suryŏng Myŏngdan,
Chŏnbukpy’ŏn [The Roster of District Magistrates and Provincial Governors of Chŏlla Province: North Chŏlla
Edition] (Chŏnpukdae Chŏllamunhwayŏnguso, 1995).
19) Dates based on the Sunjo Sillok [Veritable Records: King Sunjo].
20) Ŭpji 4: Chŏllado [History of Towns and Districts: Chŏlla Province] (Ase’amunhwasa, 1983), p.182.  Also
mentioned in soji 22.  
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crime against ethics (kangsangwipŏm 綱常違犯)), then promptly released him,
ordering him to settle out of court with Hong Hŭigap. Subsequently, the Chŏlla
provincial governor’s office did not at all deal with Yu Chinŏk’s request for a
certificate, instead consigning the duty to the Kurye district. The provincial
governor’s office imprisoned, then released Yu based on his own judgement,
exercising the judicial power of the provincial governor’s office.  
The Kurye district magistrate Hong Nag’u, for his part, did not show any good
will toward Yu Chinŏk, as he pretended to follow the orders of the provincial
governor’s office yet never actually issued the requested certificate. In addition, the
clerk at the bureau of punishments (hyŏngbangsŏla 刑房胥�) Pak Munhwan
postponed the refund of the 400-some yang as well as the return of the pertinent
documents to Yu Chinŏk. Both Hong Nag’u, abusing his position as district
magistrate, and Pak Munhwan, on the back of Hong, tried to profit from Yu’s
payment to the office. However, all their efforts did not result in any substance since
a new district magistrate took office, leading to the reinstatement of Yu’s rights.  
Ultimately, O Ch’ihun, the newly appointed district magistrate, confirmed a
judgement in favor of Yu Chinŏk: First, Hong Hŭigap’s filing a suit against his
maternal family was itself a crime against ethics and mores (kangsangwipŏm綱常違
犯); second, the promissory note supposedly by Hong’s maternal grandfather was
either a forgery or already apportioned, hence legally moot; third, the denial of his
own father’s handwriting-signature led one to believe that Hong’s forging other
documents would be more than probable. In other words, rather than relying on
detailed evidence, O Ch’ihun judged that the documents were forged and discarded
them based on ethical grounds such as Hong’s want of filial piety.  Moreover, he did
not recognize widow Yu’s rights of inheritance, a decision supported by Yu Iju’s
notarized will composed in 1793. A judge was an official whose significance lay not
in professionalism, but in actualizing justice and extending benevolence and fairness
to the common people on behalf of the monarch; as such, the newly appointed
Kurye district magistrae rendered decisions taking into consideration the specific
circumstances of the given case as well as Yu Chinŏk’s assertions.
B. Mobilization and Employment of Law
Those who were excluded from the division of assets, namely Hong Sŏkyŏng
and his party, had twice entreated to human feelings and received part of their
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maternal family’s estate. However, this did not satisfy Hong Hŭigap who believed
he possessed certain rights to expect a greater share of the inheritance, and, as such,
Hong employed several measures, including the false accusation that the defendant Yu
Chinŏk had beaten and ousted his own aunt; the intended outcome was to guarantee
that he would receive a part of the family assets.  In other words, Hong even risked
punishment in his drive for profit, mobilizing any legal measures at his disposal.21)
As for resolving inheritance disputes, it had been customary for the district office
to divest the estate directly according to legal proscriptions regarding inheritance.22)
This practice could not be continued following the solidification of the sole rights
over divestment held by the head of the estate; as the district office lacked the
precedents on which to base the apportionment of the estate, it had to depend on the
will of the estate head. However, depending solely on the said will bore the distinct
possibility of disputes amongst kin; in order to prevent the clashing of the
divestment rights of the head of the estate and the inheritors’ rights to claim part of
the estate, the district office refrained on principle from rendering decisions on
inheritance claims, instead encouraging the pertinent parties to settle out of court.  
The case at hand was concluded with the mediation of the provincial
government, which ostensibly encouraged the parties to come to a compromise on
their own (soji 20, 19 chesa), but in reality coaxed a solution out of them. Hong
Hŭigap naturally resented such an inducement, and Yu Chinŏk for his part refused to
accept the solution forwarded by the provincial government, instead repeatedly
asserting his rights, an act especially driven by his distaste over Hong’s behaviour.
Both Hong and Yu used as their bases for refuting the decision rendered by the
provincial government the latter’s statement that the division of assets shall remain
strictly a private matter,23) each interpreting it to his own advantage.  
The provincial governor’s office and the provincial government were both
official organs which, on behalf of the monarch, governed and looked after the
people, and as such, their orders, in reality, almost exceeded the gravity of those
forwarded by the king. Both Yu and Hong, however, ignored the decisions rendered
21) Cho Yunsŏn, “Soktaejŏn Hyŏngjŏn ‘Ch’ŏngni’chowa Minŭi Pŏpŭisik (On the ‘Ch’ŏngni’ Clause in the
Punishment Chapter of Soktaejŏn and  the Awareness of the Law in the General Public,” Hanguksa yŏngu, [Studies
on Korean History] 88. (Hanguksa Yŏnguhoe, 1995), p.11.   
22) Pak Pyŏngho, Hanguk Pŏpchesa [History of the Legal System of Korea], p.164. 
23) “財之分輿�分 非營邑所可之事 人家分財 非官長所可決處.”
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by the aforementioned official organs, considering them to be no more than relative
in substance and hence malleable to their own benefit. 
We must note here Yu Chinŏk’s appeals strategy. In order to reclaim all of his
rights, Yu employed not only legal measures, but also made entreaties to sentiments,
claiming his “urgent and mortifying situation.”24) Madame Cho also engaged similar
strategies to help her husband be exonerated of the false accusation of having
committed a crime against ethics, ultimately succeeding in her endeavours. Of
course, appealing to sentiments did not always guarantee a favourable outcome; Yu
in fact employed such a tactic against the inhospitable Kurye magistrate Hong Nag’u
only once before reverting to legal measures. Depending on the person for whom the
appeal was designed and on the contents of the complaint, Yu exploited innate
sentiments and natural proclivities, even going so far as to become completely
sycophantic. This type of clever maneuvering can be seen clearly in his accusing
Hong Hŭigap of furthering a claim on false grounds. Unreasonable and repeated
legal claims were considered to cause social chaos, and as such were severely
restricted by the government.25) Yu Chinŏk himself was in fact punished under this
category, leading to even his kinsmen being detained (soji 22: line 7), and to avoid
serving the penalty in its entirety, he accused Hong’s father and son of filing an
unreasonable suit (soji 22: lines 1-2).  
Moreover, Yu engaged in long and tiresome battles against the Kurye district in
order to receive the certificate as well as a refund of the 480 yang he had been
ordered to submit in the beginning of the ordeal. In his efforts to reclaim his rights,
Yu not only employed passive tactics such as appealing to mercy, but also various
and sundry active measures aimed at achieving his goal. Against Hong Hŭigap’s
assertion of inheritance rights, Yu used the Great Code of Chosŏn, revised
(Soktaejŏn 續大典) stipulation that divestment of an estate must follow the
ancestor’s will, in conjunction with the idea that no division of assets shall be carried
out for progeny past three generations from the head of the estate (soji 15: line 11), a
24) This appears in all soji in addition to the headings and closings of the soji 15, 22, and 38. Such expression
occur in many a soji (as discussed in Pak Pyŏngho’s Hanguk Pŏpchesa, p.288), but as they do not turn up in
Yusŏp’ilji, such expressions cannot be seen as being part of a set format.  
25) Cho Yunsŏn, “Soktaejŏn Hyŏngjŏn ‘Ch’ŏngni’chowa Minŭi Pŏpŭisik (On the ‘Ch’ŏngni’ Clause in the
Punishment Chapter of Soktaejŏn and  the Awareness of the Law in the General Public,” Hanguksa yŏngu, [Studies
on Korean History] 88. (Hanguksa Yŏnguhoe, 1995), pp.11-13.
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proscription in the Great Code of Chosŏn (Kyŏngguktaejŏn 經國大典)26) as well as
the Great Code of Chosŏn, revised.27) As can be seen, Yu had a clear and shrewd
understanding of the law and its contents, using and interpreting them to his
advantage.  For example, Yu refuted the official’s claim that he could not return the
documents because the former official had misplaced them by pointing out the
irrationality of such an excuse, that a former official no longer had any jurisdiction
over a claimant’s papers (soji 22: lines 9-10, soji 38: line 9). The government
assertion that the 480 yang could not be refunded because the money was either
given to Hong Hŭigap or was lost, coupled with the haphazard postponement of the
certificate, were confronted by Yu: “This is neither the proper way of litigation nor
of governing (soji 22: line 5).” All of the above clearly displays Yu’s lucid
understanding not only of a jus scriptum, but also of the underpinnings of common
law. Moreover, he cogently asserted his rights to everyone involved in this specific
legal process, including his opponent as well as the officials and clerks in the
government office.  
Beyond the legal arguments, Yu also problematized the innate quality and
disposition of the pertinent officials. Upon hearing that the government office once
again was postponing the issuing of the certificate, Yu questioned, “Is it right for the
government to deceive its people (soji 22: line 6)?” In other words, Yu made the
criticism that anyone without a real grasp of the law did not qualify to be an official,
essentially refuting the authority of the office. He had, above all, cleverly aimed all
his criticisms at the official of the neighbouring town filling in for the vacant office
(kyŏmkwan 兼官) in Yu’s own district, a tactic devised to avoid being punished for
insulting an official.28)
Going forward, Yu Chinŏk claimed a legal status equal to that of the government,
as according to his own estimation, both possessed a similar level of knowledge
regarding the inner workings of the law. Yu wrote, “Though I reside in the
countryside, I am a descendant of a central court official, and as such recognize and
fully understand the weight of the law and its spirit. My intention is not to withstand
passively my family name being ruined, its fortunes becoming bankrupted. In order
to prevent future troubles from causing my family distress once again, I request that
26) Kyŏngguktaejŏn, Hyŏngjŏn, “Sachŏn.”
27) Soktaejŏn, Hyŏngjŏn, “Ch’ŏngni.”
28) Kyŏngguktaejŏn, Hyŏngjŏn, “Sowŏn.”
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you quickly issue the certificate (soji 38: lines 10-11).” In other words, Yu expressed
a certain awareness of the idea that it is not only a person’s right, but also their duty
first to understand the law, and stemming from this knowledge, protect and reclaim
their rights. This represents a perspective, held by the non-official general public,
on the concept of the law. Law, as these people understood it, was less a technical
tool for the punishment of criminals, being instead a mechanism for actualizing
justice as well as a method by which to resolve grievances.29) Law, as they
understood it, was a useful tool with which to protect rights of both those in power
and those who are governed, and, as such, the governed became the semi-arbiters of
the law actively incorporating it for their own use, instead of remaining passive,
controlled subjects.
Both Hong Hŭigap and Yu Chinŏk employed legal maneuverings and means to
put their litigation proceedings into motion: Hong by using forged documents and
focusing on falsely bringing to attention the criminal aspect of the case, and; Yu
through taking advantage of his detailed knowledge of the law, daring at one point to
problematize even the qualifications of the government. In observing the
proceedings of the litigation at hand, we can see that the people of this time period
possessed a level of legal knowledge which allowed them to mobilize legal means to
their advantage and a sense of themselves as the semi-arbiters of these legal channels
that rival those of today’s citizens.  
V.  Conclusion
In the autumn of 1816, Hong Hŭigap filed a lawsuit that resulted in Yu Chinŏk’s
imprisonment under the charge that Yu, the defendant, had abused his aunt and
ousted her from his house (komo kuch’uk 姑母驅逐). Subsequently, Yu was able to
reclaim his rights only in the second month of 1817, after a hundred-some days had
already passed by, with the numbers of petitions filed by his relatives as well as
himself altogether surpassing twelve: Madame Cho filed thrice or more, Yu’s
biological paternal uncle and other kin filed thrice or more, and Yu himself did so
more than six times. The case was not merely one between Yu and Hong, but
29) Pak Pyŏngho, “Chosŏnsidae Wangkwa Pŏp, (The Monarch and the Law in the Chosŏn Dynasty),” Kŭnseŭi
Pŏpkwa Pŏpsasang [The Law and the Legal Thought in Modern Korea] (Chinwŏn, 1996).
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essentially one that involved the people in the center and the periphery of the case
pitted against the magistrates and the low ranking local officials subordinate to him,
with Yu’s kinsmen suffering great distress in the process. Yu nevertheless won the
case; yet this was only made possible by his vast knowledge of the law buoyed by
his firm sense of his legal rights.  
In the face of the semi-authoritarian governing body, individuals employed all
means possible to protect and extend their rights, in the process actively using the
law to their advantage. The vigorous use of legal means, oftentimes bordering on
exploitation, was especially true in cases of litigation, and the methods by which an
individual used and abused the law depended largely on the circumstances and
proceedings of the lawsuit. As such, a state policy, intended to curb the active
expression of profit-seeking ventures wherein resolutions of discord without
litigation would be heavily promoted, could not continue to be successful due to the
amplified concept of individual rights in the nineteenth-century Chosŏn society.
Individuals at times even went so far as to ignore or interpret freely an official order
when it essentially failed to serve their purpose and play to their advantage, and,
further, did not hesitate to claim their rights against government officials. As has
been seen previously, Yu Chinŏk even criticized the qualifications of the official
dealing with the case at hand.  
All of the aspects mentioned above illustrate a general transformation of the
nineteenth-century Chosŏn society. At this juncture in time, an individual was
becoming more of an independent person rather than the merely passive subject of
the monarch at the mercy of the government officials that one had been up to this
juncture. Otherwise put, the nineteenth-century individual no longer resembled the
mid-Chosŏn one who spent their life furthering, either directly or indirectly, the
cause of Neo-Confucian ideology, having been indoctrinated by and in it from an
early stage; the individual in the nineteenth century had become one who actively
pursued their rights, capable of maneuvering through the legal channels in the
pursuit of their self-interest.  
Law is a tool for regulating advantages and interests in society, and thus a sphere
in which human propensity toward self-interest becomes most transparent. This
paper is merely confined in its scope to the events that took place in a specific
geographic location, namely Kurye, and as such may be rather limited in terms of
the conclusions one can draw on a more broad level. An overall generalization of
any given social facet, however, is achieved first through the accumulation of the
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particular instances of the particular characteristic. Moving forward, it will be of
utmost interest to extract a more complete picture of the social transformation
through time and the individual as historical agent throughout the Chosŏn dynasty
through gathering more primary sources and investigating them thoroughly.
KEYWORDS : soji, legal culture, trials in the Choson dynasty, ch’ongsong,
litigation, the Great Code of Choson (Kyongguktaejon)

























Appendix:  Lineage Map
*: Testifiers, #: Donee, ^: Writer (1794 YuYiju’s Instrument).
Source : Munhwa Yu’s Genealogy, Edited by Munhwa Yu’s Main Association, 1984
Munhwa Yusi Sekyŏbo, Munhwa Yusi Taechonghoi, 1984, pp. 548-557.
